Abstract. Signature schemes that are derived from three move identication schemes such as the Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr and modied ElGamal schemes are a typical class of the most practical signature schemes. The random oracle paradigm [1, 2, 12 ] is useful to prove the security of such a class of signature schemes [4, 12] . This paper presents a new key technique, \ID reduction", to show the concrete security result of this class of signature schemes under the random oracle paradigm. First, we apply this technique to the Schnorr and modied ElGamal schemes, and show the \concrete security analysis" of these schemes. We then apply it to the multi-signature schemes.
Introduction

Background
To realize a practical and provably secure cryptosystem is one of the most important research topics, and digital signatures are a very important ingredient in cryptography. This paper focuses on practical and provably secure signature schemes.
Standard Security Paradigm versus Random Oracle Paradigm
The rst formal denition of the security for digital signatures (\existentially unforgeable against adaptively chosen-message attacks") was given by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [7] , and a concrete signature scheme satisfying this security denition was shown by assuming the existence of a claw-free pair of functions [7] . Hereafter, this formal denition and model for signatures is called the \standard security paradigm", and a signature scheme with the standard security paradigm is just called a \provably secure" signature scheme.
An ultimate target in the standard security paradigm was to realize a provably secure signature scheme assuming the weakest computational assumption, the existence of a one-way function. This target was nally solved armatively by Naor, Yung and Rompel [9, 13] . Their solution, however, was geared towards feasibility result and thus very inecient and far from practical. In addition, even the scheme by [7] is much less ecient than typical practical schemes such as the RSA [14] and Schnorr [15] schemes. Therefore, no provably secure scheme as ecient as typical practical schemes has been proposed.
To realize provable security and eciency simultaneously, another paradigm to prove the security of cryptographic schemes has been proposed [1, 2, 12] . This is called the \random oracle paradigm", in which an ideally random and imaginary oracle, the \random oracle", is assumed when proving the security, and the random oracle is replaced by a practical random-like function such as a one-way hash function (e.g., SHA etc.) when realizing it in practice. Here random oracle F generates an answer randomly to a query posed to F at rst. If the same query is asked later, F will answer the same value as was provided to the rst query. Although the security under the random oracle paradigm cannot be guaranteed formally when using a practical random-like function in place of the random oracle, this paradigm yields much more ecient schemes than the standard security paradigm. The security with the random oracle gives an informal guarantee to the security of practical random-like functions.
In addition, the random oracle model not only provides a methodology for constructing an ecient and secure scheme, but also gives some security guarantee for schemes that practitioners intuitively constructed using a random-like functions in actual systems.
Asymptotic Security Analysis versus Concrete Security Analysis
The random oracle paradigm has another advantage over the standard security paradigm: it can much more easily provide \concrete security analysis", which avoids complexity theory and asymptotic property when proving the security (i.e., reducing the breaking of a primitive problem to breaking a signature scheme). Such concrete security analysis provides a much better guarantee than asymptotic security analysis, since the computational complexity currently required to break a signature scheme with a \xed size" (e.g., 1024 bits) and \xed key" can be estimated by the assumed lower bound of the complexity of breaking the underlying primitive with the \xed size" and \xed key." Note that asymptotic security gives no useful information on the security of a xed size and xed key system.
The concrete security analysis of the reduction from breaking a signature scheme to solving a primitive problem is usually trivial and optimal (i.e., optimally ecient). Hence, we have to obtain the concrete security analysis of the opposite direction of the reduction as much as optimal. If the opposite direction is as ecient as the trivial direction, then we can call such a reduction exact. That is, the exact reduction implies that the required time (and success probability) of breaking the signature scheme is exactly equivalent to that of breaking the primitive problem. (In other words, the signature scheme is exactly as secure as the primitive problem.)
The (almost) exact security of the RSA signature scheme along with random functions has been shown under the random oracle paradigm [2] . The asymptotic security of the Schnorr and modied ElGamal schemes has been proven under the same paradigm [12] .
Main Result
This paper shows the concrete security analysis of the Schnorr, modied ElGamal (MEG) schemes and multi-signature schemes under the random oracle paradigm.
(The concrete security analysis of the other signature schemes based on the FiatShamir conversion technique can be proven similarly.)
In order to show the concrete security analysis of the signature schemes, we have developed a new technique, \ID reduction", in which the identication scheme corresponding to the signature scheme is used when showing the reduction from breaking the underlying primitive to breaking the signature scheme. There are two stages of reduction. The rst stage is from breaking the corresponding identication to breaking the signature scheme, and the second stage is from breaking the underlying primitive to breaking this identication.
In order to obtain a tighter (i.e., close to optimal) reduction and its tighter evaluation from breaking the underlying primitive to breaking the signature scheme, our \ID reduction" technique has an advantage over the previous technique, \forking lemma", by Pointcheval and Stern [12] . This is because the rst stage of ID reduction (ID reduction lemma) is optimal ? in these signature schemes and the second stage of this reduction (Lemma 13 and Lemma 15) may be more ecient than the reduction in the forking lemma of [12] , since to analyze the corresponding identication scheme is easier than to analyze the signature scheme directly. Here, nding a forking pair of signatures in the forking lemma of [12] corresponds to nding two success entries in a heavy row in our approach. Therefore, the ID reduction technique seems to be more appropriate to obtain a tighter reduction than the previous technique.
In addition, the asymptotic result of the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme proven in [12] can be trivially obtained just by combining the ID reduction lemma as the rst stage reduction and the well-known techniques given by [5] as the second stage reduction.
Framework
In this paper, we investigate a specic class of signature schemes that are derived from three move identication schemes, where the identication schemes are perfect zero-knowledge against an honest verier [6] . This section shows the models and notations of such signature and identication schemes.
Signature Scheme
In the signature scheme, signer P publishes public key K p while keeping secret key K s . In this paper, we will adopt the following model as a signature scheme, which covers the class of the Fiat-Shamir scheme [4] Key generation: Each signer P generates a pair, (K p ; K s ), of a public key and a secret key using a key generation algorithm G which, on input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, produces (K p ; K s ). Signature generation: P generates the signature of his message m using a public random oracle function F as follows: P generates X from both K s and random string R, accesses the random oracle function F to get E = F(X; m) 2 E, calculates Y using K s , R and E, and sends (X; m; Y ) to V . Verication: a verier V checks the validity of the signature of the message by the relations of (K p ; X;E; Y ) and E = F(X; m).
Remark. We assume that this signature scheme is derived from the following identication scheme.
Identication Scheme
Here we can dene an identication scheme that produces the above-mentioned signature scheme.
In an identication scheme, prover P publishes a public key while keeping the corresponding secret key, and proves his identity to verier V .
Model 2. (Identication Scheme)
Key generation: Prover P generates a pair, (K p ; K s ), of a public key and a secret key using a key generation algorithm G which, on input 1 k , where k is the security parameter, produces (K p ; K s ). Identication Protocol: P proves his identity, and verier V checks the validity of P's proof as follows:
Step 1 P generates X from both K s and random string R and sends it to V .
Step 2 V generates random challenge E 2 E and sends it to P.
Step 3 P generates an answer Y from (K s ; R; E) and sends it to V
Step 4 V checks the validity of the relations of (K p ; X;E; Y ).
Remark. We assume that this three move protocol is perfect zero-knowledge against an honest verier.
Security
We will adopt the quantiable notion of exact security proposed in Reference [2] .
Security of Key Searching Problem
Denition 3. A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) A breaks a key search problem with (t; ) if and only if A can nd a secret key from a public key with success probability greater than within processing time t. The probability is taken over the coin ips of A. Denition 4. A key searching problem is (t; )-secure if and only if there is no adversary that can break it with (t; ).
Security of Identication Schemes
Denition 5. A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) A breaks an identication scheme with (t; ) if and only if A as a prover can cheat honest verier V with a success probability greater than within processing time t. Here, A doesn't conduct any active attack ?? . Here, the probability is taken over the coin ips of A and V . Denition 6. An identication scheme is (t; )-secure if and only if there is no adversary that can break it with (t; ).
Security of Signature Schemes
Next we will quantify the security of a signature scheme: Here we assume that the attacker can dynamically ask the legitimate user P to sign any message, m, using him as a kind of oracle. This model covers the very general attack of the signature situations, adaptive chosen message attack. Denition 7. A probabilistic Turing machine (adversary) A breaks a signature scheme with (t; q sig ;q F ; ) if and only if A can forge a signature of a message with success probability greater than . We allow chosen-message attacks in which A can see up to q sig legitimate chosen message-signature pairs participating in the signature generating procedure, and allow q F invocations of F, within processing time t. The probability is taken over the coin ips of A; F and signing oracle P. Denition 8. A signature scheme is (t; q sig ; q F ; )-secure if and only if there is no adversary that can break it with (t; q sig ; q F ; ).
ID Reduction Lemma
The general techniques by which we can derive signature schemes from three move interactive protocols were proposed in [4] and hash functions are used in order to create a kind of virtual verier, which gives the conversion from an identication scheme to a signature scheme.
To analyze the security of such a class of signature schemes, we will examine the opposite direction of conversion for adversaries in Lemma 9 in order to prove the security of signature schemes as the rst stage of ID Reduction Technique.
Here note a signature scheme and an identication scheme in this section mean those dened in the previous section. We assume the uniform coin ips over E (i.e., Pr[E occurs] = 1 #E ) are provided. Lemma Step 1 Select an integer i satisfying 1 i q F randomly.
Step 2 Run A 1 with a random oracle F and get (X; m; E;Y ).
Step 3 If (X; m) = Q i and E = i , then output (X; m; E; Y ). Otherwise output (Q i ; i ; r i ) where r i is a random element of the range of Y . If A 1 succeeds in forging a signature (X; m; E; Y ), there are two cases: 1) (X; m) was not asked to the random oracle F, and 2) (X; m) was asked as the i-th query to the random oracle F (1 i q F ).
In the former case, the success probability of A 1 is at most 1=#E, because of the randomness of the random oracle. Thus 2) Construct a machine A 3 using A 2 as follows:
Step 1 For j = 1 to q sig do.
Step 1-1 Run A 2 with simulated (X i ; m i ; E i ;Y i ) (1 i j 0 1), and get a message m j chosen by A 2 whose signature is requested to the signer.
Step 1-2 Simulate (X j ; m j ; E j ; Y j ) by the standard perfect ZKIP simulation technique of the corresponding identication scheme with an honest verier. If there exists an integer i(< j) satisfying X j = X i , discard X j and repeat this substep.
Step 2 Run A 2 with a random oracle F and simulated (X i ; m i ; E i ; Y i ) (1 i q sig ), and get (X; m; E;Y ), where m 6 = m j for 1 8j q sig .
Step 3 Output (X; m; E; Y ). If A 2 does not ask (X i ;m i ) (1 i q sig ) to F, then A 2 cannot distinguish the simulated message-signature pairs from legitimate pairs because of the perfect indistinguishability described in Section 2 and the the randomness of F's output.
If A 2 asks (X j ; m j ) to F, then A 2 should output (X j ; m j ; : : :). This contradicts that the output message should not be equivalent to m j (1 8j q sig ).
The success probability of A 3 is given as follows: Pr[A 3 succeeds] = Pr[A 2 succeeds] = 0 ; while t 0 = t + (the simulation time of q sig signatures in Step 1-2).
3) Let Q be a query from A 3 to the random oracle F and be an answer from F to A 3 . Construct a machine A 4 using A 3 interacting with an honest verier V as follows:
Step 1 Run A 3 and get a query Q = (X; m) which is sent to the random oracle F.
Step 2 Send X to V and get a challenge E from V .
Step 3 Run A 3 with an input = E and get (X; m; E; Y ).
Step 4 Output Y to V . Note that a valid signature (X; m; E; Y ) satises a relation of (K p ; X; E; Y ) and E = F(X; m). When a verier V checks the validity of this relation, V accepts A 4 's proof with (t 0 ; 0 ). Note that this does not mean the \exact" security, since 0 in the \exact" security, while 0 qF in our \optimal" reduction.
In addition, note that this observation depends on the signature scheme model shown in Section 2.
Schnorr Signature Scheme
We discuss here the Schnorr scheme [15] as an example, though similar results can be obtained for the Fiat-Shamir scheme [4, 5] etc. The schemes can also be implemented using an elliptic curve [8] .
Scheme
Key generation: A trusted center publishes two large primes, p and q, such that q j (p 01), and element g 2 (Z=pZ) 3 of order q. A signer P chooses a secret key s 2 Z=qZ and publishes the public key I, where I = g s mod p. Signature generation: A signer P generates the signature of his message m using a public hash function F, and a verier V checks the validity of signature of the message as follows: P generates a random integer r 2 Z=qZ, calculates X = g r mod p, e = F(X; m) 2 Z=qZ and y = r + es mod q, and sends (X; m; y) to V . Verication: V checks the validity of a signature of the message by the following equations: g y ?
XI e (mod p) and e ? = F(X; m).
Security
The following identication scheme is reduced to the Schnorr signature scheme in Section 4.1, and it will be analyzed adopting the scenario given in Section 3.
Identication Scheme
Key generation: A trusted center publishes two large primes p and q such that q j (p 0 1), and element g 2 (Z=pZ) 3 of order q. A prover P chooses a secret key s 2 Z=qZ and publishes the public keys I, where I = g s mod p. Identication Protocol: P proves his identity and a verier V checks the validity of P's proof as follows:
Step 1 P generates a random integer r 2 Z=qZ, calculates X = g r mod p, and sends X to verier V .
Step 2 V generates a random integer e 2 Z=qZ and sends it to P.
Step 3 P calculates y = r + es mod q and sends it to P.
Step 4 V checks the following equation: g y ? XI e (mod p). 
Heavy Row Lemma
Sketch of Proof:
Assume that there is a cheater A who can break an identication with (t; ). We will construct a machine A 3 which breaks the key searching problem of (p; g; I) with (t 3 ; 3 ) using A. We will discuss the following probing strategy of H to nd two 1's along the same row in H [5] :
Step 1 Probe random entries in H to nd an entry a (0) with 1. We denote the row where a (0) is located in H by H (0) . Step 2 After a (0) is found, probe random entries along H (0) to nd another entry with 1. We denote it by a (1) . It is proven that this strategy succeeds with constant probability in just O(1=) probes, using Lemma 12 concerning a useful concept, heavy row, dened in Definition 11.
Let p 1 be the success probability of step 1 with 1 repetition. p 1 (1) e (0) 0e (1) mod q in Schnorr's scheme, since q is prime and 0 < e (0) 0 e (1) < q. 2
Security of Signature Scheme
The following theorem is proven by combining Lemma 9 and Lemma 13. Here we will estimate the degree of \exactness" of our reduction (i.e., how much close is the above mentioned reduction to the exact case) by comparing the quantities of (t 3 ; 3 ) and (t; ). For the purpose, we normalize (t; ) into (t + ; + ) with + = 3 . Let = be the number of repetition of (t; )-breakable algorithm, in order to attain the same success probability as 3 . Since 3 = 1 2 (1 0 1 e ) 2 > 9=50, 0:223 holds because of the requirement of 1 0 (1 0 ) = 3 > 9=50. Therefore, t + = t ( 0:223) and the ratio of t 3 and t + gives the degree of exactness of our reduction.
If we assume that t t 0 and 0 qF , since q sig is small and q is large, then its ratio is 3q F = 13:5q F . Thus, our reduction is still ecient, though it is not exact. Here note that q F can not be eliminated from this ratio because of the optimality of the ID reduction lemma.
Modied ElGamal Signature Scheme
We will discuss the modied ElGamal (MEG) signature scheme [12] in this section.
Scheme
Key generation: the same as the Schnorr scheme.
Signature generation: A signer P generates the signature of his message m using a public hash function h as follows: P generates a random integer r 2 (Z=qZ) 3 , calculates X = g r mod p, e = F(X; m) 2 Z=qZ and y = e0sX r mod q, and sends (X; m; y) to V . Verication: a verier V checks the validity of the signature of the message by the following equations: g e ? X y I X (mod p) and e ? = F(X; m). Note: In the original ElGamal scheme, the order of g 2 (Z=pZ) 3 is p 0 1. Although we can prove the security of the MEG with ord(g) = p01 in a manner similar to that with ord(g) = q, here for simplicity of description we assume ord(g) = q.
Security 5.2.1 Identication Scheme
The following identication scheme is reduced to the MEG signature scheme in Section 5.1, and it will be analyzed adopting the scenario given in Section 3.
Identication Protocol: P proves his identity and verier V checks the validity of P's proof as follows:
Step 1 P generates a random integer r 2 (Z=qZ) 3 , calculates X = g r mod p, and sends X to verier V .
Step 3 P calculates y = e0sX r mod q, and sends it to P.
Step 4 V checks the following equation: g e ? X y I X (mod p). Assume that cheater A breaks the ElGamal identication with (t; ) for (p; I) and all e g 2< g >. We will construct a machine A 3 that breaks the key searching problem of (p; g; I) with (t 3 ; 3 ) using A.
We will discuss the following probing strategy of H to nd two 1's along the same row in H [5] for the identication scheme with parameter (p; g;I):
Step 1 Probe random entries in H to nd an entry a (0) with 1. We denote the row where a (0) is located in H by H (0) . Step 2 After a (0) is found, probe random entries along H (0) to nd another entry a (1) with 1.
Step 3 Calculate the value of r as follows, r = e (0) 0 e (1) y ( 
More Ecient Reduction of MEG
Clearly the reduction for the MEG signature scheme is much less ecient than that of the Schnorr scheme, and the reduction does not preserve the parameter, (p; g; I). If we modify the MEG scheme as follows, the reduction can be almost as ecient as that of the Schnorr scheme and can preserve the parameter. The modied version of the MEG scheme is the same as the MEG scheme except: Verier V checks whether gcd(X; q) = 1, and if it does not hold, V rejects the signature, (m; X;y). Note that when a valid signer generates (m; X; y), the probability that gcd(X; q) 6 = 1 is 1=q (negligible probability).
6 Multi-Signature Schemes Multi-signature schemes are signature schemes in which plural signers (e.g., L signers) jointly generate a signature (multi-signature) of a message under the condition that the length of the multi-signature is less than the total length of ordinary (single) signatures by plural signers (e.g., L 2 jsj, where jsj is the ordinary signature length). We can apply our ID reduction technique to the \one-round type" of multisignature schemes x . This section briey introduces our results regarding multisignature schemes. Due to the space limitation, we omit a detailed description of the results [11] .
x The \two-round type" of multi-signature schemes have been proposed [10] . Our technique can also be applied to these schemes easily.
The Proposed Multi-Signature Schemes
We propose provably secure multi-signature schemes against the most general attack, adaptively chosen message insider attacks [7] with the random oracle 2) The schemes can also be implemented using an elliptic curve [8] .
3) It is possible for each P i to check the validity of (I 1 ; :: : ; I i01 ; X 1 ; : : : ; X i01 ; m; E 1 ; :: : ; E i01 ; Y i01 ) before generating his signature. Remark. The multi-signature scheme of Type I is forgeable by a true signer, for example, signer L can make a multi-signature of arbitrary message m without coalition of other (L 0 1) signers.
Conclusion
This paper presented a new key technique, \ID reduction", to show the concrete security result of a class of practical signature schemes under the random oracle paradigm. We applied this technique to the Schnorr and modied ElGamal schemes, and showed the \concrete security" of these schemes. We also applied it to the multi-signature schemes. This technique should be useful in proving the concrete security of various types of signatures such as blind signatures, group signatures and undeniable signatures.
